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Abstract
This paper studies a duopolistic credit market in which borrowers differ in risk.
In our competition game, one lender is in an advantaged position with respect to
the other due to past relations with the borrowers. We investigate the features of
the equilibrium contract and show that the best borrower is indifferent between
the dominant and the opponent lenders’ contract while the other borrowers prefer
that of the dominant lender. Also, repayment and collateral do not depend upon
the borrowers’ respective project risk.
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1 Introduction
A great amount of the literature on credit markets has focused on a perfectly competitive
banking environment. In practice, however, a given firm has only one or a few banks
with which it has closer and more regular business relations. The archetype is the
Japanese main bank system. The main bank has a long history of transaction with
the firm, through which the bank has invested not a small amount of money to gather
information on the firm’s management. The main bank is in an advantaged position
with respect to other potential lenders in competition for a credit contract because it
has better information on the firm and thus cost advantages in screening and monitoring
the firm’s project.
On the subject of competitive adverse selection, Rochet and Stole (1997) have an-
alyzed two competing sellers in Hotelling’s environment and Villas-Boas and Schmidt-
Mohr (1999) have investigated the credit contract in the same context. Finally, Champ-
saur and Rochet (1989) have studied two firms’ quality price competition. The present
paper analyzes the competition described above via a variant of asymmetric Bertrand
competition. Two banks, simultaneously, offer heterogeneous firms incentive contracts
composed of repayment and collateral. One lender has closer relations with the firms1
and thus incurs less costs in screening the firms’ respective investment project. The cost-
advantaged bank, unsurprisingly, holds a dominant position in this competition. To win
a contract, however, it must assure the borrower, at least, of the utility level offered
by his competitor’s contract. Thus, competition necessarily involves the issue of type-
dependent reservation utility. We know—see Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and
1As stated above, due at least in part to past investment in information gathering.
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Rodriguez-Clare (1995)—that when the reservation utility is type-dependent, there are
two countervailing incentives on the part of the agent, namely: understating and over-
stating. In contrast to standard adverse selection theory, we are uncertain in such a case
for which type the participation constraint binds. We shall find that the participation
constraint binds at the best type. Bad firms have good cause to resort to their regular
bank because the contract terms proposed by the other bank are so disadvantageous.
Better firms prefer trading with the alternative bank.
One feature of the literature on type-dependent reservation utility is that the princi-
pal is often assumed to provide utility greater than reservation utility, i.e. U ≥ R on the
whole interval of types.2 In our context, this assumption is unrealistic. The dominant
bank might not necessarily serve all firms. If the competitor offers some customers high
utility, the dominant bank may prefer to exclude those customers to extract more rent
from the others. Here we obtain, however, that the dominant bank provides all types
with a utility at least as high as that provided by the opponent.
The existing literature on credit contracts consists, in general, of two strands: one
assuming a perfectly competitive environment (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bester (1985),
Bester (1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987)) and the other a monopolistic environment
(Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Schmidt-Mohr (1997)). This article’s merit is that it
assumes the middle ground of the two situations: it deals with a screening contract in
imperfect competition.
The paper is novel with respect to the literature on relationship banking as well.
Sharpe (1990) has shown that even perfectly competitive banking provides an initial
lender with monopolistic power over time since the lender can learn about the borrower’s
characteristics. Rajan (1992) examined the pros and cons of relationship lending as
opposed to capital market debt for a borrower. Boot and Thakor (2000) investigated
2Works on competition with incentive contracts naturally consider the possibility of type exclusion
(e.g. Champsaur and Rochet (1989) ). However, the literature on type-dependent reservation utility
such as Lewis and Sappington (1989), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995) assumes the overall type
inclusion. The only exception is Jullien (2000).
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the effects of competitive pressure from capital markets upon relationship lending and
demonstrated that banks might enhance relationship lending activity. Closest in the
spirit to the present paper is Dell’Ariccia, Friedman, and Marquez (1999), who studied
the competition between two lenders in relationship banking.
The existing literature on relationship banking rules out the scenario that a bank
constructs an incentive mechanism as a loan contract, on the assumption that after
the first lending, the bank learns all information about the borrower. We analyze the
situation in which a bank, even in an established relationship with a borrower, is sub-
ject to asymmetric information and constructs an incentive mechanism to overcome the
asymmetry.
Collateral is seldom incorporated in studies of relationship banking. None of the
above papers includes collateral in its investigation. Boot and Thakor (1994) is probably
the only work to examine collateral, but it does so in the context of moral hazard and not
of adverse selection. We find in our model of competition that the lenders’ requirement
for collateral and reimbursement is independent of the borrower’s respective project risk.
In practice, banks often grant their borrowers a line of credit, in which the conditions of
the loan are prespecified; banks do not examine each and every loan application of the
borrowers. The finding of this paper confirms this.
In the next section, we present the model and review the monopolistic case. The
third section deals with our main objective, duopolistic competition.
2 The model
All of our agents are risk-neutral. There is a firm with a risky investment project
requiring investment cost I.3 The project succeeds or fails with probabilities p and 1−p,
respectively. p takes its value in the non-empty interval [p, p] ⊂ (0, 1). The investment
3Alternatively, we can suppose that there are firms different in their project risks, the total mass of
which is 1.
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cost I is identical for all p. In case of success, the risky project yields the return X and
in case of failure, none. The firm is assumed to lack liquidity I and thus resort to a bank
in order to finance its project. The distribution of p is public knowledge. F (p) is the
absolutely continuous distribution function and f(p) the density function with f(p) > 0
on the whole interval [p, p]. Every economic agent knows the return X given success.
However, only the firm knows the value of p.
We consider competition for borrowers between two lenders. Usually, a firm with
an investment project refers to a bank with which it has regular relations. The bank
better knows the practice or character of the firm’s management and is more capable of
apprising the project’s risk than other banks. The bank is also advantaged in terms of
the costs necessary to evaluate the project.
Suppose that there are two lenders: Lenders 1 and 2. Lender 1 has established
business relations with the firm. Lender i (i=1 or 2) offers a contract to the firm, in
which the lender claims repayment Ri if the project is successful and collateral Ci in
case of failure. We further assume that the lender is able to gather the amount of money
I with zero interest rate; this does not affect the results. The lender incurs costs in
examining the borrower’s project. We write the cost as Li ≥ 0 and assume that
L1 < L2. (1)
This implies that Lender 1 has closer relations with the borrower and is able to screen
the borrower at less cost.
The borrower is also subject to incurring costs when soliciting the lender’s credit.
The borrower must, for instance, prepare documents or presentations of his financial
situation in order to convince the lender of his credit-worthiness. Let us denote this cost
by Ki ≥ 0, where we assume
0 < K1 < K2. (2)
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The inequality reflects the borrower’s closer relationship to Lender 1, which enables a
lower cost in applying for this lender’s credit.
We assume that the firm possesses collateralizable resources that cannot be liquidated
at the start of the investment and that the value of the resources is equal toW regardless
of the probability of success p. We assume
0 < W ≤ L2 + I. (3)
Due to limitations on collateralizable resources, the lenders may not be able to com-
pletely secure their loan. Even by requiring the largest possible collateral, the lenders
cannot totally dissipate the risk of the project’s failure.
Unknowledgeable of the success probability p (referred to from now on as type), the
lender constructs a contracting mechanism that induces the borrower to reveal his type.
We focus on a direct mechanism (c.f. Myerson (1979))4. Formally, the mechanism is
defined as a map from [p, p] to E2 where E is a large enough compact interval of R,
p 7→ (Ri(p), Ci(p)).
We restrict ourselves to the study of pure strategies. Facing the mechanism, the borrower
is a player of the game and reports his type. By reporting his type to be p′, the borrower
p obtains the profit: ui(p, p
′) := p(X −Ri(p′))− (1− p)Ci(p′)−Ki.
The contract (Ri(p), Ci(p)) is implementable if and only if, for any p, p
′ ∈ [p, p]
ui(p) ≥ ui(p, p′).
where ui(p) := p(X −Ri(p))− (1− p)Ci(p)−Ki.
4In the case of a single principal, it is well known that no generality is lost by focusing on the direct
mechanism. This is not generally true of the multi-principal case, but in our context of competition with
exclusivity, restriction to the direct mechanism does not raise the problem of generality. See Martimort
(1996) and Martimort and Stole (2002) for details.
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With an implementable contract, the lender’s expected profit from the borrower is
Πi(p) : = pRi(p) + (1− p)αCi(p)− Li − I,
= pX − ui(p) + (α− 1)(1− p)Ci(p)−Ki − Li − I.
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. α indicates that the valuation of collateral between the lender and the
borrower might be different, for instance, on account of transaction costs in liquidating
collateral.
Notice that in our setting, the perfect information first best contract is R(p) =
X − K
p
, C(p) = 0, and u(p) = 0.
As is usual with the mechanism design problem, we transform the implementability
condition into the following condition.
Lemma 1 (incentive compatibility condition). If the contract (Ri(p), Ci(p)) is imple-
mentable, then the following conditions hold,
ui(p) is convex and absolutely continuous, (4)
u˙i(p) =
ui(p) + Ci(p) +Ki
p
a.e.5 (5)
Conversely, if (4) and (5) hold, the implementable contract (Ri(p), Ci(p)) can be
obtained by setting,
Ri(p) =
pX + (p− 1)Ci(p)−Ki − ui(p)
p
. (6)
Proof. See Rochet (1987).
Observe that, contrary to standard literature (Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) for in-
5a.e. stands for almost everywhere.
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stance), we make no assumption on F (p) such as the monotone hazard rate condition.
Before analyzing competition, let us examine briefly the case of the monopolist lender,
where we suppress the subscript i. We suppose that the project is worth carrying out
for at least p,
pX − L−K − I > 0.
The monopolist maximizes his expected profit EΠ(p) under the incentive compati-
bility constraint (4) and (5), 0 ≤ C(p) ≤ W and the participation constraint u(p) ≥ 0
over types accepting the contract. Here we normalize reservation utility to zero. Since
u is non-decreasing from (5), the participation constraint is replaced by u(p`) = 0. where
p` is the lowest type served.
Proposition 1. The interval of types [p`, p] accepts the lender’s contract (i.e. u(p) ≥ 0
on this interval) and the monopolist’s optimal contract exhibits full bunching and is
expressed as
R(p) = X − K
p`
, C(p) = 0, u(p) = K
(p
p`
− 1).
The lowest type served p` is determined by the transversality condition:
(p`X −K − L− I)f(p`)− K
p`2
∫ p
p`
f(t)tdt = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
One notable feature of our result is that the lender demands no collateral, irrespective
of the presence of liquidation costs. Likewise, the repaymentR is independent of type and
the optimal contract exhibits full bunching. Section 4.6.1 in Freixas and Rochet (1997)
treats a case similar to ours in the two-type setting with type-dependent reservation
utility. They show that the monopolist lender requires collateral of the better type. Our
8
result, distinct from theirs, derives from zero reservation utility.
Another feature is that the lender excludes the lower types. We are given the fixed
cost and the expected investment return pX approaches 0 when p becomes smaller. The
lower the lender sets the cut-off type, the larger the range of types from which the lender
makes earnings. Due to the participation constraint, however, the lender thereby makes
less profit from each individual type. The cut-off type is determined by this trade-off.
We can see that if K is zero, we have R(p) = X, C(p) = 0, and u(p) = 0: whole
bunching, full rent extraction. This is in stark contrast to the standard literature (e.g.
Guesnerie and Laffont (1984)), which shows the agents as discriminated by a regularity
assumption on F and as enjoying informational rent.
3 Competition
In order to focus on the competition between lenders, we make the following assumption.
Every borrower’s project is worth realization from a social point of view:
pX −K2 − L2 − I ≥ 0 for p ∈ [p, p].
We consider the game in which the borrower can contract with only one principal
and in which the two principals maximize EΠi(p) in competition for the borrower, by
simultaneously offering an implementable contract such that
0 ≤ Ci(p) ≤ W. (7)
For Lender 2’s profit, we clearly have Π2(p) if u2(p) ≥ u1(p) and 0 otherwise on the
assumption that in the case of a tie u2(p) = u1(p), Lender 1 wins the contract as it is
the borrower’s regular bank.
Stole (1995) analyzed symmetric competition of this type between two identical firms.
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Unlike in his study, however, we have the constraint on the range of the control variable
(7), which potentially compromises the marginal cost argument in Bertrand competition.
However, for the equilibrium pattern of type capturing, we obtain the following lemma,
which considerably simplifies our analysis.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, Lender 1 offers borrowers utility at least as great as does
Lender 2 (u1 ≥ u2) over the whole interval. In other words, Lender 1 wins contracts for
all types.
Proof. Suppose that in equilibrium, Lender i offers ui. Due to the absolute continuity
of ui, we know that Lender 1 wins a combination of intervals of type. Lender 1 can
then imitate Lender 2’s contract on the intervals on which the latter lender gives higher
utility as doing so does not violate the incentive compatibility constraint (4) and (5).
We can verify this by recognizing that the superior envelope of the convex functions
sup{u1(p), u2(p)} is a convex function.
Because of the cost advantage, Lender 1 can make a greater profit by offering Lender
2’s contact on the intervals initially won by Lender 2. As a result, Lender 1 will win
over the whole interval.
This lemma allows us to express the participation constraint in our problem in a
simple way. Given Lender 2’s implementable contract, Lender 1 proposes a contract
solving the following problem O:
max
u1(p),C1(p)
∫ p
p
Π1(p)f(p)dp (8)
s. t.
(4), (5) and (7) for i = 1,
u2(p) ≤ u1(p) for p ∈ [p, p]. (9)
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Here we face an instance of a problem of type-dependent reservation utility. Note
that our scenario can be extended to the case of more than two lenders. As long as the
costsKi and Li are ordered as in (2) and (1), the situation can be reduced to competition
between the two most cost-advantaged lenders.
Let us examine more closely Lender 2’s strategy in equilibrium. Contrary to standard
Bertrand competition, we cannot use the marginal cost argument and deduce Lender
2’s nil profit. Due to the restriction on C, there exists no implementable contract that
entails zero profit.
First it is obvious that Lender 2 offers a contract such that Π2(p) ≥ 0. At the very
moment of contracting, the lender sees which contract the borrower has chosen and thus
learns his type. If the lender thereby incurs a loss, he will not sign the contract. The
non-negative profit condition is thus:
Π2(p) ≥ 0. (10)
Then the largest utility which the borrower can obtain with Lender 2 is expressed by
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In the Nash equilibrium of the two-lender game, Lender 2’s equilibrium
implementable contract (u2(p), C2(p)) is such that it satisfies (10) (in inequality) and
also that
u2 ≥ u˜2 on [p, p],
where u˜2 is of any implementable contract (R˜2(p), C˜2(p)) which satisfies (10) (in inequal-
ity).
Proof. Suppose that Lender 2 offers a contract which gives u˜2(p). Lender 1 can then
make a counter-offer that gives u2(p) and brings in positive profit. All borrowers weakly
prefer the contract by Lender 1 and Lender 1 therefore wins them over. Lender 2, as a
result, is bound to propose u2(p). Faced with this offer by the opponent, Lender 1 will
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make an offer giving slightly more utility to the borrowers to win them over. Lender 2
sticks to the contract u2(p) since it cannot offer a more interesting contract on account
of the non-negative profit condition.
Some remarks are to be made. First, this is essentially a pointwise maximization
problem amongst admissible pairs, i.e, the implementable (u2, C2) satisfying (10). Un-
certain, however, is that there exists a u2 that is weakly larger than any other admissible
u˜2 at every point. One can imagine a case in which there are two admissible uˆ2 and
u¯2 that are weakly larger at every point than any other admissible u2 but in which uˆ2
is larger than u¯2 at some points and contrariwise at others. In this case, there does
not exist an equilibrium pair as is stated in the lemma. Second, even if an equilibrium
is shown to exist, characterization is not an easy task. Accordingly, we deal with our
competitive game by means of the optimal control technique. If an equilibrium exists
as in the lemma, it must be a solution of the following problem R:
max
u2(p),C2(p)
∫ p
p
u2(p)f(p)dp
s. t.
(4), (5), (7), (10) for i = 2.
Note that R might have a solution where it is not the case with the pointwise maxi-
mization in the lemma.
The last constraint comprises the state variable u2 and the control variable C2. It
is difficult to clearly characterize the problem with a mixed state-control constraint.
However, when there is no cost to liquidation, C2 disappears and the constraint is reduced
to a pure state constraint. On account of manageability, we content ourselves with this
case.
Lemma 4. Assume that α = 1. In the equilibrium of our competition game, then,
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Lender 2’s contract (R2(p), C2(p)) is such that for every p ∈ [p, p]
R2(p) =
1
p
(
L2 + I
)
+
(
1− 1
p
)
W,
C2(p) =W,
u2(p) = pX − p
p
(
L2 + I
)
+
(p
p
− 1)W −K2.
Proof. See the appendix.
When collateral resources are sufficient (W = L2+ I), we obtain the standard result
of zero profit in Bertrand competition. By contrast, when the availability of collateral
is quite limited, the lender makes profit except from the lowest type. The reason is that
in that case, despite the force of competition to drive down the profit, the lender cannot
offer the implementable contract leading to zero profit given limitations to collateral
resources.
As in the monopolistic case, the collateral and repayment are identical among all
types of borrowers; hence bunching. In contrast with monopoly, however, competition
induces Lender 2 to require the maximum collateral of every borrower.
We reformulate Problem O in the light of our lemma. In particular, we replace (9)
by
u2(p) ≤ u1(p) (11)
and verify (9) at the end. Note that thanks to the lemma, our problem is formulated in
a form close to the discrete one in Section 4.6.1 in Freixas and Rochet (1997). Our case
can be viewed as a continuous generalization of theirs.
Proposition 2. Suppose that α = 1. Then the solution of Problem Q is as follows:
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C1(p) =W,
R1(p) = (1− 1
p
)W +
1
p
(
L2 + I
)
+
1
p
(
K2 −K1
)
,
u1(p) = pX +
(p
p
− 1)W − p
p
(
L2 + I
)− p
p
K2 +
(p
p
− 1)K1.
Proof. See the appendix.
As in the monopolistic case, we obtain full bunching: the repayment and collateral
are identical across all types. A noticeable difference brought by competition is that both
lenders require collateral of every borrower. (5) shows that the larger the collateral is,
the larger utility the borrower obtains. As seen in Lemma 4, competition drives Lender
2’s profit lower because the competitive pressure forces him to offer the borrower higher
utility. Lender 2 uses collateral to this end. To counter the competition, Lender 1 also
has to propose high utility to the borrower and therefore both lenders use collateral.
The theoretical literature on competition over credit contracts with exclusivity (for
instance Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Schmidt-Mohr (1997)) asserts that a good
borrower pledges more collateral than a bad one because the former is likely to succeed
in the investment project and unlikely to lose the collateral. Our main difference is that
we introduce heterogeneity between banks, whereas the rest of the existing literature
generally deals with perfect competition. To the best of my knowledge, our result is new
in the universal risk-neutral environment.
The empirical works of Berger and Udell (1990) and Berger and Udell (1995) report
that riskier borrowers more often pledge collateral than safer ones. However, it is unclear
in those studies how much collateral banks initially wanted or whether there were enough
collateralizable resources at the time of contracting. Further empirical work must test
the coherence of our result with the actual loan case.
To interpret our result, let us distinguish between borrower risk and loan risk. Bor-
rower risk is learned over time by the lender through a series of business relationships
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and borrowers are classified according to the risk. Loan risk varies, in general, with
each investment project of the same borrower. In the present model, K1 and L1 can be
interpreted as the lender’s classification of borrowers due to borrower risk whereas loan
risk is represented by p. The proposition states that the loan contract depends upon
borrower risk (K1 and L1) but not loan risk (p). This contract is identical to the line
of credit widely used in practice in which the loan terms are fixed in advance and the
borrower can draw a loan when needed.
In contrast to standard principal-agent problems, the participation constraint (9) is
binding at the best type. With u1(p)−u2(p) decreasing, the worst type obtains positive
rent whereas the best type has all rent extracted. Lender 1 wishes to extract a borrower’s
rent and must at the same time leave the borrower reservation utility. Lender 1 therefore
faces a dilemma between rent extraction and rent assurance.
Good borrowers are offered a rather nice contract by Lender 2; at the limits, the
best borrower is indifferent between the two banks. This result is well borne out by
observation of the actual economy in which a bad firm often has no alternative to its
regular bank since other banks offer either a contract of very poor terms or even flatly
deny the borrower; a good firm, by contrast, can resort to other banks with much greater
ease to obtain an alternative offer.
In general, customer capturing pits the lender against a trade-off. Serving a wider
range of types brings in more sources of profit but there is a negative effect. Serving
more types implies that the lender needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility and
participation constraints for a wider range of types. This is more demanding than
serving fewer types. The lender may therefore wish to forego some borrowers when the
negative effect outweighs the positive on profit. In doing so, the lender can extract
enough rent from the rest of all types to offset losses from giving up some types. In our
case, Lemma 2 tells us that the positive effect is larger and that Lender 1 chooses to
capture all customers.
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By examining u1 − u2, we can assert that the borrower sees the smaller difference
between the two lenders’ contracts the smaller K2 −K1 is. Harsher competition drives
contract terms to be favorable to the borrower.
The literature on type-dependent reservation utility (Lewis and Sappington (1989),
Feenstra and Lewis (1991) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995)) reports that when
reservation utility is linear, a non-degenerate interval of types earns profit equal to
reservation utility and on that interval, pooling results. They treat a model similar
to a labor contract in which the principal’s objective function is strictly concave. In
our standard financial contract model, the principal’s objective function is linear in the
control variable, where only the highest type obtains utility equal to reservation utility.
Our findings suggest that the standard results of principal-agents schemes with type-
dependent reservation utilities of the above works depend crucially on the specification of
principals’ preferences. Further, as mentioned in the introduction, these authors assume
ad hoc the satisfaction of the participation constraint over the entire type space. This
assumption also contributes to their conclusion.
4 Appendix
4.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We first ignore the convexity of u and check finally if it is satisfied. The Hamiltonian is
written with an adjoint variable λ:
H = Π(p)f(p) + λ(p)
u(p) + C(p) +K
p
.
Then, we obtain λ = −1
p
∫ p
p
f(τ)τdτ ≤ 0 from λ˙ = f − λ
p
a.e. and the transversality
condition λ(p) = 0. Maximization leads to C = 0. Then u can be found from (5):
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u(p) = u(p`)
p
p`
+K
(p
p`
− 1).
λ(p`) 6= 0 leads to u(p`) = 0 due to the transversality condition λ(p`)u(p`) = 0. The ignored
convexity condition is satisfied and R can be retrieved from (6). The cut-off type p` is
determined by the free-time transversality condition (see Neustadt (1976)).
4.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Let us solve Problem R while replacing (10) by Π2(p`) ≥ 0. At the end, we verify that
the original condition is satisfied. The Hamiltonian is written as;
H = u2f + λ
u2 + C2 +K2
p
where λ is an absolutely continuous adjoint variable. We have
λ˙ = −f − λ
p
a.e.
The transversality conditions are
λ(p) ≥ 0, λ(p)Π2(p) = 0, λ(p) = 0.
We have immediately λ = 1
p
∫ p´
p
f(t)tdt > 0. Maximizing the Hamiltonian, we obtain
C2 = W . u2 can also be found if we notice that λ(p) 6= 0 and thus Π2(p) = 0. R2 can be
retrieved as well. It is easily seen that the original constraint (10) ignored is satisfied.
4.3 Proof of Proposition 2
The Hamiltonian is:
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H =
(
(α− 1)(1− p)f + λ
p
)
C1 + (pX −K1 − L1 − I − u1)f
+ λ
u1 +K1
p
.
The necessary conditions to optimality are
λ˙ = f − λ
p
a.e. on [p, p],
λ(p) = 0, λ(p) ≥ 0, λ(p)(u1(p)− pX +K2 + L2 + I) = 0,
Easily established is the fact that λ(p) = 1
p
∫ p
p
f(t)tdt and therefore
u1(p) = pX −K2 − L2 − I.
We obtain C1(p) and u1(p) as in the proposition.
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